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Abstract— Critical infrastructure control systems continue to 
foster predictable communication paths and static configurations 
that allow easy access to our networked critical infrastructure 
around the world. This makes them attractive and easy targets 
for cyber-attack. We have developed technologies that address 
these attack vectors by automatically reconfiguring network 
settings. Applying these protective measures will convert control 
systems into “moving targets” that proactively defend themselves 
against attack. This “Moving Target Defense” (MTD) revolves 
about the movement of network reconfiguration, securely 
communicating reconfiguration specifications to other network 
nodes as required, and ensuring that connectivity between nodes 
is uninterrupted. Software-defined Networking (SDN) is 
leveraged to meet many of these goals. Our MTD approach 
eliminates adversaries targeting known static attributes of 
network devices and systems, and consists of the following three 
techniques: (1) Network Randomization for TCP/UDP Ports; (2) 
Network Randomization for IP Addresses; (3) Network 
Randomization for Network Paths 
In this paper, we describe the implementation of the 
aforementioned technologies. We also discuss the individual and 
collective successes for the techniques, challenges for deployment, 
constraints and assumptions, and the performance implications 
for each technique. 
Keywords—Moving Target Defense, Software Defined Networking, 
Computer Security, IP Address Hopping, Dynamic Defense 
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks, in particular Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
systems, continue to foster predictable communication paths 
and static configurations [1] that provide a vector for accessing 
the critical assets of a network. Among the many 
vulnerabilities that CI systems possess, a static configuration 
can make CI systems attractive and easy targets for cyber-
attack. In our research, we provide a means to address these 
attack vectors by automatically reconfiguring network settings 
and randomizing application communications dynamically. 
Applying these protective measures will convert CI systems 
into “moving targets” that proactively defend themselves 
against attack. 
Our MTD architecture is comprised of several techniques to 
manage network reconfiguration, ensuring that connectivity 
between nodes is uninterrupted, while providing randomization 
at the application and network levels. The goal of our research 
is to significantly reduce the class of adversaries able to rely on 
known static Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of CI network 
devices to launch an attack. Our approach introduces 
uncertainty and unpredictability for adversaries reconnoitering 
a network to determine the function of nodes on computer 
networks, and also for adversaries attempting to map the 
topology of computer networks. It is comprised of the 
following techniques: 
 Network Randomization for TCP/UDP Ports: our
TCP/UDP port hopper is implemented at the host level.
The Port Hopper follows a distributed system model that
relies on time synchronization for all nodes
communicating in the network. Communications between
endpoints “hop” between network port numbers at
specified intervals of time that are configurable. Those
intervals include tolerance thresholds to account for
delays incurred during transmission and traversal.
 Network Randomization for IP Addresses:  the
implementation of our IP Address-Randomizer consists of
an SDN controller that manages communication among
network devices that pass IP-addressed traffic. As traffic
ingresses the network-layer device, its source-destination
pairs are validated and rules are installed to
encode/decode randomized IP addresses. The duration of
these rules can be made static, random, or be forced to
change from a trusted third-party. Since the IP Address-
randomizer is implemented at the network-layer, it is
transparent to the communicating endpoint processes, and
may be implemented without endpoint modification.
 Network Randomization for Network Paths: the Network-
Path Randomizer uses overlay networks to impede traffic
analysis, given that traffic analysis is a technique often
used by an adversary to identify endpoints. The underlying
network consists of several nodes that form a physical
mesh topology.  Routing through the mesh is coordinated
among the nodes via an SDN controller. For each flow
through the network, the controller may assign asymmetric
forward/reverse paths, with the ability to modify them
given specified parameters (time, bitrate, etc). This
approach also improves network resiliency to
eavesdropping attacks and denial of service attacks by
providing multiple possible communications paths
between nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes some of the past MTD research; Section 3 describes 
  
the threat model and the restrictions we place on the adversary; 
Section 4 describes our implementation of the MTD 
approaches; Section 5 outlines our experiment setup and 
results; and finally Section 6 concludes the paper, summarizing 
our results, some of the limitations of our approach, and some 
of our future areas of research. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of related approaches to mitigating attacks over a 
network exist. 
Anonymization of network traffic is an active area of research 
with several implementations available in both the commercial 
and open source communities. For example, onion routing [2] 
depends on the use of an overlay network made up of “onion 
routers.” The onion routers are responsible for 
cryptographically removing one layer of an encrypted packet at 
a time to determine the next hop routing information and 
forwarding each packet to their final destinations. The 
weaknesses are that side channel attacks exist including timing 
attacks [3], packet counting attacks [4], and intersection attacks 
[5] that can reveal the source and destination nodes of a 
communication stream. Similarly, garlic routing [6] combines 
and anonymizes multiple messages in a single packet but is 
also susceptible to the same attacks. 
Tor is one of the most popular implementations used for onion 
routing with over 2.25 million users [7]. However, it has been 
shown empirically with the aid of NetFlow data, that Tor 
traffic can be de-anonymized with accuracy rates of 81.4% [8]. 
The results are achieved by correlating traffic between entry 
and exit points within the Tor network to determine the 
endpoints in communication. 
While onion routing is useful for anonymization, it has been 
shown that overlay networks can be used to mitigate 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [9]. The overlay 
networks reroute traffic through a series of hops that change 
over time to prevent traffic analysis, and thus prevent targeted 
DDoS attacks. In order for users to connect to the secure 
overlay network, they must first know and communicate with 
the secure overlay access points within the network. The 
knowledge of the overlay nodes prevents external adversaries 
from attacking nodes on the network directly. This design can 
be improved by relaxing the requirement of hiding the secure 
overlay access points within the network architecture.  
Artificial diversity is another active area of research that is 
used to defend computer systems from attack. Introducing 
artificial diversity into the Internet Protocol (IP) layer has been 
demonstrated to work through Software Defined Networking 
(SDN) [10]. Flows, (based on incoming port, outgoing port, 
and incoming and outgoing Media Access Control (MAC) 
addresses) are introduced into software-defined switches. The 
rules for a packet that match a given flows parameters are 
rewritten with random source and destination IP addresses 
while the packet is in flight within the network. The drawback 
is that through traffic analysis, endpoints of the communication 
stream can still be learned. A passive adversary can observe 
traffic and correlate which flows map to which endpoints. 
Steganography can also be used to hide and covertly 
communicate information between multiple parties within a 
network. The methods described in current literature [11] 
include the use of IPv4 header fields and reordering IPsec 
packets to transmit information covertly. The described 
approach would have to be refined to increase the amount of 
information (log2 n! bits that can be communicated through n 
packets) that can be covertly communicated if a significant 
amount of information is desired to be exchanged. 
Transparently anonymizing IP-based network traffic is a 
promising solution that leverages Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs) and Tor [12]. Tor hides the users true IP address with 
the use of a Virtual Anonymous Network (VAN) while the 
VPN provides the anonymous IP addresses. The challenge for 
this solution is that every host must possess client software and 
a VPN cryptographic key installed, which hinders the 
scalability of this approach. To reduce the burden on larger 
scale networks, it may be more effective to integrate this 
approach into the network-level using an SDN-based approach. 
Some combination of the benefits provided by these 
approaches is necessary to provide full network anonymity, 
which we believe could significantly improve security for time 
critical systems. Critical infrastructure systems fit this need and 
currently have no single solution existing to counter the 
reconnaissance phase of an attack. Some of the areas of prior 
work that need to be addressed in order to make their 
application feasible include reducing the overhead costs of 
multiple layers of encryption, the ability to easily scale up to a 
large number of nodes, and relaxing the requirement to hide 
nodes participating in the anonymous service. Additionally, 
critical infrastructure systems are composed of both legacy and 
modern devices that may not be capable of implementing IP 
address randomization, port randomization, or overlay 
networks at the end systems directly. For this reason, a 
transparent solution to the end systems is needed that can 
merge the above capabilities in a critical infrastructure 
environment. The approach that we present in this paper 
explores the use of software-defined networking as a solution. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
The network randomization (NR) portion of our approach 
assumes that an adversary has successfully gained access to a 
system and is able to observe traffic within the network. The 
goal of the adversary may be D/DoS, reconnaissance, targeting 
a specific service, or targeting a specific host on the network. 
Our goal is to prevent that adversary from learning the true IP 
addresses and port numbers of the services being offered on a 
network to mitigate the scope of damage of targeted 
reconnaissance attacks 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
We implemented a proof-of-concept for randomizing IP 
addresses, port numbers, and network routes. Each of these 
techniques is described in detail below. 
 
A. NR with Port Randomization 
Randomizing network port numbers increases the difficulty 
required for an adversary to learn the services running on a 
  
system. Well-known services are typically run on port numbers 
less than 1024 and are defined in the /etc/services file on 
UNIX-like systems. One of the first steps an adversary 
typically takes during the reconnaissance phase of an attack is 
to probe a system or sniff traffic on the network to learn which 
services are running. This knowledge is used to gather 
vulnerabilities related to those services and subsequently plan 
attack vectors based on those services. Port randomization 
forces the adversary to both track and reverse engineer the 
communication protocols to learn information that is typically 
easy to determine without network port randomization. 
Port randomization has been implemented on each host within 
a network with the aid of the netfilter kernel module. In our 
implementation, the iptables firewall utility is used to facilitate 
the random port mappings. iptables provides an interface for a 
system to filter traffic entering, passing through, and leaving a 
system based on policy rules defined by a user. The port 
randomization implementation leverages the Network Address 
Translation (NAT) iptable filter chain. Rules applied to the 
NAT chain allow a user to filter just before a packet has been 
routed on the incoming interface and just before a packet 
leaves the outgoing interface. The NAT filter rules allow a user 
to redirect or overwrite port numbers and IP addresses in each 
packet if it matches user-specified IP header parameters. 
 
Figure 1: iptables filter engine control flow. 
 
Figure 1 shows how packets traverse the filtering engine [13] 
provided by iptables. With the NAT chain, first the packet will 
pass through the PREROUTING chain. The PREROUTING 
chain allows a user to overwrite both the IP addresses and port 
numbers before routing takes place. If the potentially modified 
packet is to be forwarded to a remote system on the network, 
then it will be passed through the POSTROUTING chain 
where packets can be redirected to another IP address or port 
number if desired. If the packet is destined for a local host 
process, then the potentially modified packet is sent to that 
process. If the local process wishes to send a packet outbound, 
then that packet will pass through the NAT OUTPUT rules 
where modifications of IP addresses and port numbers can be 
made, as was the case with forwarding. 
  
The algorithm used to randomize port numbers in our 
implementation is as follows, in pseudo-code: 
// well known ports 
$portMaps = [1, 2, ..., 1023] 
random.seed(time()) 
// random permutation of well known ports 
random.shuffle($portMaps) 
 
for $i = 0 to len($portMaps) do: 
   // map a random port number coming into 
   // a system to a well known port number  
   $inboundRule = iptables -t nat  
        -A PREROUTING -p tcp  
        --dport $portMaps[$i] -j DNAT  
        --to-destination 127.0.0.1:($i+1) 
   // map a well known port number leaving  
   // a system to a random port number  
  $outboundRule = iptables -t nat  
        -A OUTPUT 
        -p tcp --dport ($i+1) -j DNAT  
        --to-destination  
        127.0.0.1:$portMaps[i] 
   // Apply the rules to the system 
   syscall($inboundRule) 
   syscall($outboundRule) 
 
In the algorithm, first, all nodes synchronize clocks and seed 
the random number generator with time. We note that time was 
used for simplicity in our test implementation, but in practice a 
non-predictable seed should be used. Next, the port mappings 
are randomized and iterated to create random mappings. The 
random mappings are then appended to an incoming 
PREROUTING iptables NAT rule as well as to an outgoing 
OUTPUT rule. Both rules to create and invert the mappings are 
necessary for both sides of the communication channel to be 
aware of the translation. A cron job is then scheduled to run 
every minute on each machine participating in the port 
mapping. Our implementation is required to run on each 
endpoint participating in the port randomization. However, a 
similar implementation can be deployed at the network layer 
within an SDN setting so that our approach can scale to a larger 
number of nodes and be transparent to the end nodes. 
B. NR with IP Address Randomization 
The goals of randomizing the network IP addresses are to 
deceive an adversary and mitigate “hitlist” type attacks [14] 
without placing additional burden on the end users of a 
network. To achieve these goals, it is desirable to randomize 
the IP addresses at the switch level so that the randomization is 
transparent to the end user themselves. This architecture 
eliminates the need for every client to load and run the IP 
address randomization protocol. Only the network switches 
participating in this protocol are required to maintain and 
perform the IP address mappings which allows the IP address 
randomization to scale on a per-switch basis rather than a per-
user basis. This architecture also reduces the attack surface 
from every client on the network to only the switches running 
on the network. 
The IP address randomization application is a multi-component 
module written for an OpenFlow-based software-defined-
networking (SDN) controller.  At the heart of the IP address 
randomizer are three components: the network randomization 
algorithm and OpenFlow interface (nwr), the random IP 
address generator (gen) and the network mapping database 
module (netmap).  Ancillary modules/code provide for a 
RESTful API via which an external application may trigger a 
force-randomization action for the network.   
The nwr component is the main body of the IP address 
randomizer application.   Upon initialization, the nwr module 
reads a network specification file and populates a backend 
database.  Thereafter, it creates random IP address generator 
objects for each network under randomization.   
The nwr module listens for OpenFlow (OF) events regarding 
the connection of OF compatible switches.  It then creates a 
  
Switch object for each of the connected switches, and keeps 
track of those Switch objects in using the unique datapath-id 
(dpid) of the OF switch.  Using a deny-by-default approach, the 
Switch object will only switch packets when said packets 
match installed flow rules on the switch.  If there is not a flow 
rule that the packet may match against, the packet header is 
sent to the controller to determine how to treat the packet. 
The nwr module hosts an address-resolution protocol (ARP) 
server.  So, if the packet is an ARP packet, the controller 
checks the backend database to see if the requestor and the 
requested IPs are part of the network.  If they are, it responds 
with the appropriate MAC address.  After this condition is met, 
the primary packet processing algorithm is traversed. 
The algorithm only permits communication (and random IP 
address assignment) between entities that are part of the 
network as specified, and are directly connected to an 
OpenFlow-compatible switch.  Special considerations have 
been given to devices that may not be able to meet the latter 
requirement – particularly router gateways and/or DHCP 
servers.   Gateways are included in the network map, and are 
also specified in the nwr code.  When an ARP is received from 
a gateway address for a random IP address, the gateway IP 
address and MAC addresses are checked against the backend 
database.  If validated, the database is accessed for the MAC 
address of the random IP address and subsequently returned to 
the gateway.  A similar process is employed for DHCP servers. 
When the two endpoints in a communication request are 
validated, random IP addresses are assigned to each.  Flow-
rules are then constructed and sent to the endpoint’s first hop 
OpenFlow switch.  These flow rules contain matches for the 
respective endpoints to translate real IP addresses into the 
assigned random IPs (and vice versa).  For this, there are two 
implementations: (1) reactive IP address randomization, and; 
(2) proactive IP address randomization.  The former only 
installs flow-rules when communication is initiated by an 
endpoint.  The latter enumerates links for all pre-defined 
connection requirements, and actively installs flow-rules to 
first-hop switches.  
A roll interval prescribes the timeout period for each of the 
randomization flow-rules.   Each flow rule’s idle timeout is set 
for infinity.  Thus, this period is used for the hard timeout of a 
flow-rule.  The roll intervals may be set for static periods of 
time, or for random periods of time between a set of upper and 
lower bounds. 
The gen component contains the logic for random IP address 
generation.  It contains a queue data structure whose depth is 
initialized with the size of network (total assignable IP 
addresses under the defined network length).  Its purpose is to 
keep track of the used random IP addresses, so as to avoid 
reassignment or collision.  Additionally, an array is kept to 
track the random IP address and the true MAC address of the 
endpoint.  This is primarily used for ARP responses to 
gateways that may not be part of the subnetworks under 
randomization.  
The netmap component provides the necessary interface 
backend database that stores the true network map(s).  All 
entries are derived from a network specification file. The 
netmap component itself consists of the several functions to aid 
the primary nwr switch algorithm. The getSource function is 
used by nwr to verify that a packet received from some IP is 
allowed to be within the network(s) under randomization.  
Using the source’s IP address, and packet information detailing 
the data path identifier (dpid; the unique identifier of an 
OpenFlow switch on a network) and port it was received on, a 
check is done against the data in the database.   If the IP 
address, dpid and port are validated, the dpid’s “uplink” port is 
returned to the nwr (for the crafting of the forwarding action in 
the nwr flow-rule action).  If the data is invalid, nothing is 
returned and the packet(s) is dropped.  The getDest function 
does a similar test, but on the destination IP address for the 
packet.  If the destination IP address is not in the database, 
nothing is returned (and the packet is dropped).  If the 
destination is valid, an array of information containing the 
destination MAC address, dpid, port and dpid uplink port is 
returned.  The final function, getMAC, is primarily used by 
nwr’s ARP server, to retrieve MAC addresses for validated 
source/destination pairs.  The function returns nothing for 
unfound MAC addresses. 
C. NR with Route Randomization 
IP address randomization is still susceptible to traffic analysis. 
A passive adversary can determine the endpoints in 
communication by monitoring ingress and egress points in a 
network regardless if IP address randomization is deployed. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to randomize the paths that 
packets traverse through the network to prevent such 
correlations. To randomize paths, the network topology 
describing endpoints and interconnections is needed to 
compute all possible network paths between each pair of nodes 
that does not contain loops. The set of network nodes a packet 
can traverse are defined as an overlay network as shown in 
Figure 2. When two endpoints communicate, a random path is 
selected as the circuit switched line of communication within 
the overlay network for a configurable period of time. This 
circuit is periodically randomized and is user configurable on 
how frequently it is randomized. A Breadth First Search (BFS) 
algorithm is used to generate all possible paths. A stack is 
maintained to ensure that no paths are included that contain 
loops to prevent. Since the paths packets take within the 
network are constantly changing, an adversary must correlate 
traffic at every switch participating in the overlay network 
instead of just the entry and exit points of packets. 
 
Figure 2: Nodes A and B communicating through an overlay of switches 
C, D, and E with flows installed from the SDN Controller. 
 
Our implementation operates within an SDN setting where the 
  
controller is responsible for learning the topology and installing 
random flows for packets to traverse. Since a centralized 
controller manages the installed flows, the path randomization 
is transparent to the end devices. The initialization costs 
associated with the path randomization implementation itself 
are the storage and computational costs to calculate all possible 
non-looping paths between each pair of nodes. Because the 
paths are constantly changing, our implementation proactively 
installs flows to avoid the same startup costs each time paths 
are randomized. The performance overheads vary depending 
on network topology, link speeds, and additional hops taken 
within the randomly selected network path. 
V. EXPERIMENT SET UP AND RESULTS 
To assess the efficacy of our network randomization 
approaches, we leveraged research done by Van Leeuwen, et al 
[15] regarding the development of defensive work factors for 
MTDs.  The experimental setup consisted of a highly-
instrumented testbed using virtual machines running the three 
different randomization techniques.  For the port and IP 
hopping techniques, each endpoint in the virtual system ran 
network performance monitoring software to capture 
performance data for TCP and UDP; the former was comprised 
of bandwidth counts, while the latter consisted of bandwidth, 
jitter and packet loss counts.  Included in the parameters for 
testing were the rotation intervals for the reactive IP address 
randomizer.  To test route randomization, we used the IPerf 
[16] tool to measure Round Trip Times (RTT), bandwidth, and 
data transfer times. 
Table 1 displays the TCP bandwidth tests for the Port-hopper 
and IP address randomization techniques.  Tests were run for 
240 seconds and 480 seconds, to observe the smoothing effect 
for longer periods of time.  For proactive IP address 
randomization, the randomization time were fixed at 30 
seconds.  For the Port-hopper, hopping was set at 1 second 
intervals.  The reactive IP address randomizer had 
randomization intervals set at 10, 30, 60 and randomly between 
30 and 60 seconds.   
Table 1: TCP Bandwidth Tests for IP Address and Port Randomization 
 
Test Duration (s) Technique BW Percentage 
240 Port hopper 0.977628 
480 Port hopper 0.981913 
240 IP-proactive 0.998191 
480 IP-proactive 0.998593 
240 IP-reactive 10s 0.711685 
 IP-reactive 30s 0.908663 
 IP-reactive 60s 0.952302 
 IP-reactive random 0.955762 
480 IP-reactive 10s 0.724593 
 IP-reactive 30s 0.910393 
 IP-reactive 60s 0.967297 
 IP-reactive random 0.953270 
 
RTT, data transfers and bandwidth measurements were 
collected with path randomization disabled and enabled as 
shown in Table 2. The experiment was performed using five 
overlay switches between a pair of nodes communicating 
within a virtual machine network. With path randomization 
enabled, longer routes than the direct path were randomly 
selected which negatively affected the RTT, data transfers and 
bandwidth measurements. 
Table 2: No Randomization vs. Path Randomization 
 
 RTT (ms) 
10s Data 
Transfers 
(GB) 
Bandwidth 
(Gbit/s) 
1MB 
Transfer 
(ms) 
Baseline 50.90798 22.25135 19.21674 69.11273 
Random 
Path 
62.64078 21.59769 20.59946 101.96778 
 
To test UDP, tests were again run for 240 and 480 seconds; 
bandwidth streams were set for 1Mb, 10Mb, 50Mb and 
100Mb.  Here, we captured the resultant jitter and packet loss 
metrics, as show in the figures below.  The bandwidth tests for 
UDP were less interesting, all three techniques performed at 
99% or better, with the exception of reactive IP address 
randomization for 10 second rotation intervals – at 100Mbit 
streams, they were only able to satisfy 98% of the stream data 
rate.  
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Figure 3: Port Hopper 
 
Of the three techniques, the port hopper most closely 
represented the baseline traffic tests.  At 100 Mbits, the 
smoothed averages of bit loss were approximately 0.10 units 
different.  The jitter profiles between the tests remained largely 
the same. 
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Figure 4: IP Address Proactive 
 
The proactive IP address randomization technique displayed 
the same jitter profile as the baseline tests, finding a ‘sweet 
spot’ the 10 Mbit date rate.  The bit loss was higher than the 
port hopper, exceeding the baseline by approximately 0.8 units.   
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Ji
tt
e
r 
in
 m
s
Data Rate in Mbits
IP-Reactive UDP/Jitter
10/240s
10/480s
30/240s
30/480s
60/240s
60/480s
Rand/240s
Rand/480s
base-240s
base-480s
 
Figure 5: IP Address Reactive 
 
  
Tests performed on the reactive IP address randomization 
technique involved varing the rotation time of the IP addresses, 
specifically for 10, 30, 60 and a random interval between 30-60 
seconds.  As expected, those experiments with smaller rotation 
times experience greater bit loss, with as much as 
approximately 1.2 units greater than baseline.  Interestingly, we 
expected the bit losses to be higher than the proactive IP 
address randomization approach – due to the reactive IP 
address randomization approach having to install flows on 
demand, and the proactive IP address randomization installing 
them beforehand – but for a 30 second rotation time the bit 
losses are strikingly similar, at approximately 1.35 units.  Like 
the previous techniques, however, the impact to jitter was 
minimal. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Computer networks, in particular systems running in many 
critical infrastructure facilities, continue to foster predictable 
communication paths and static configurations that provide a 
vector for accessing the critical assets of a network. In our 
research, we provide a means to mitigate certain classes of 
attacks by automatically reconfiguring network settings and 
randomizing application communications dynamically. 
Our experimental results show that the port randomization 
approach provides the least amount of performance impact, 
while successfully maintaining connectivity of a 
communication session.  While port hopping works well to 
thwart application-based attacks, it still does not address 
protocols below TCP/UDP (e.g., ICMP).  Addressing those 
types of attacks, as well as others mentioned, may be done with 
the IP Randomization techniques.  The experimental results for 
the IP address randomization showed that while the two 
approaches successfully maintained connectivity between two 
hosts communicating with one another, impacts to performance 
were greater than the port hopper, most notably with the 
reactive IP address randomization approach.  The advantage to 
the reactive IP address randomization approach is that 
resources and flow-rules are only used when communication is 
required; the reactive IP address randomization approach may 
suit well for low-bandwidth applications such as SCADA.  
However, for systems that require greater bandwidth coupled 
with delay-intolerance, the proactive IP address randomization 
approach should be considered. Path randomization should be 
used with care since additional hops through the overlay 
network may cause potentially unacceptable delays. In time 
critical applications, limiting the number of additional random 
hops in the overlay network should be considered. 
A. Limitations 
1.  Our focus for IP address randomization has only been at the 
switch level. The functionality of OpenFlow would allow this 
technique to be applied to other network elements, for 
example, routers, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
2.  The port randomization and IP address randomization 
techniques can be run in tandem but are separate pieces of 
code. A more elegant design would be to combine the two— 
this is possible but outside the scope of our project.     
3.  IP address randomization must consider a large enough 
bitmask.  For reactive IP address randomization, four IP 
addresses are used for each bidirectional communication 
session, and two IP addresses are used for the proactive IP 
address randomization implementation. 
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